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sary	measures	as	proposed	 in	 the	 report.	The	EU’s	 role	 should	
be	 focused	 on	 promoting	 contract	 pilot	 studies,	 disseminating	
the	results	of	decentralised	pilot	projects,	providing	guidance	or	
framework	 regarding	 consumer	 empowerment	 and	protection,	
and	rethinking	the	design	of	retail	market.	
•
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Background





ised,	 large-scale	 dispatchable	 power	 plants.	 Nowa-
days,	 the	European	electricity	 systems	are	evolving	
towards	a	generation	mix	that	is	more	decentralised,	














holders	 and	 policy	 makers	 in	 Europe,	 e.g.	 in	 the	
Energy	Roadmap	2050	(“energy saving and manag-
ing demand: a responsibility for all”),	in	the	Internal	
Market	Communication	(“stronger demand response 
in distribution networks”)	 and	 in	 the	 Energy	 Effi-
ciency	Directive	(“demand response is an important 
instrument for improving energy efficiency”).	 The	
gradual	roll-out	of	smart	meters	at	residential	 level	
and	the	deployment	of	smart	grids	are	expected	to	








ity	 introduced	 by	 demand	 response.	 Privacy	 con-
cerns	 and	 fear	 of	 reduced	 consumption	 autonomy	
make	up	two	more	arguments	against	a	meaningful	
level	 of	 active	 demand	 response.	 Accepting	 these	
statements	means	that	we	 leave	consumers	to	drift	
on	their	own	and	admitting	that	 there	 is	no	future	




present	 recommendations	 to	 empower	and	protect	
consumers	in	their	shift	to	active	demand	response	
participants.
Consumers’ potential and willingness to 
participate in demand response
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Categorisation dimension 1: Consumer load mix
The	potential	of	consumers	to	participate	in	demand	









ing,	 fridge,	 electric	 vehicle,	 etc.)	 and	 non-storable 
load.	Next,	non-storable	load	can	be	further	catego-

















Categorisation dimension 2: Consumer preferences
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It	 is	 important	 to	note	 that	 consumers	are	not	ho-
mogenous	 in	their	perception	of	 these	criteria.	For	
instance,	 loss	 of	 autonomy	 can	 be	 a	 cost	 for	 one	
consumer	 whilst	 a	 benefit	 for	 another;	 and	 differ-
ent	consumers	might	attribute	different	values	to	the	




pate	 in	 demand	 response.	Consumers	 can	 then	 be	
categorised	according	to	similar	sets	of	preferences.
Demand response contract: the missing 
piece in the puzzle?
Contracts	are	currently	a	missing	piece	in	the	puz-
zle	 of	 demand	 response	 take-off;	 they	 have	 been	
relatively	 under-researched,	 especially	 regarding	
the	 consumer-oriented	 impact.	However,	 contracts	
with	 demand	 response	 intermediaries	 (sometimes	
referred	 to	 as	 ‘aggregators’)	 are	 the	 ‘software’	 for	
consumers	 to	participate	 in	demand	response.	The	







port	 adopts	 a	 consumer-centred	 approach	 and	 fo-
cuses	on	demand	response	contracts.	
Based	on	the	established	literature	and	experiences	
from	 industrial	 consumers’	 demand	 response	 and	







Box 2: Contract interpretation of consumer criteria
Contract Price risk Volume risk Complexity Autonomy/  Privacy loss
Financial 
compensation
Time of use 
pricing Limited None Limited None Limited
Dynamic pricing High None High None High	potential
Fixed load capping None Limited	 High Limited Limited
Dynamic load 
capping None High High Limited High	potential
Direct load 
control None None None High
Limited/	
High	potential
6 ■ THINK - Policy Brief ■ Issue 2013/04 ■ June 2013 
peak	pricing;	(3)	volume-based	static	contracts,	e.g.	
fixed	load	capping;	(4)	volume-based	dynamic	con-
tracts,	 e.g.	dynamic	 load	capping	and	 interruptible	
contracts;	and	(5)	control-based	contracts,	e.g.	direct	
load	control	contract.	We	demonstrate	that	there	is	
an	 interaction	 between	 the	 contract	 types	 and	 the	
consumers’	load	mixes/preferences.	












The second interaction: consumer preferences and 
contract
The	five	retained	contract	types	also	give	an	explicit	
or	 implicit	 interpretation	 to	 the	 aforementioned	
consumer	criteria4.	As	 shown	 in	Box	2,	 some	con-







control;	 and	 financial	 compensation	 has	 a	 higher	






A toolkit of consumer empowerment and 
protection





of	 contracts,	 including	 the	 five	 contract	 types	 dis-




enough;	 consumers	 also	need	 to	be	 empowered	 to	









(1)	 Mandatory	 consumer	 profiling	 is	 key	 to	 raise	
consumers’	 awareness	 and	 to	 educate	 them	
on	 impacts	 of	 different	 options.	The	 profiling	
should	be	the	result	of	a	standard	survey	on	the	








parameters)	 should	 be	 regulated.	 Transparent	
information,	e.g.	through	disaggregated	billing,	
should	 be	 mandatory	 to	 allow	 adequate	 con-
tract	benchmarking	in	the	comparison	tool.
(3)	 Monitoring	 and	 optimisation	 of	 the	 range	 of	
contracts	helps	to	limit	the	complexity	of	con-
tract	 terms,	 while	 still	 allowing	 competition	
and	innovation	in	contract	design.	
(4)	 Adequate	 data	 protection	 is	 needed	 to	 raise	
consumers’	trust	to	reveal	personal	information	
before	and	after	signing	a	contract.




sistance	 and	 protection	 to	 prevent	 them	 from	
being	penalised	for	their	inability	to	provide	ac-
tive	demand	response.	
What is beyond? — The market design








How to guarantee there is an adequate range of 
contract for consumer choices? 
Our	 analysis	 shows	 that	 one	 single	 market	 player	
might	not	have	incentives	to	offer	an	adequate	range	
of	demand	response	contracts,	because	of	 their	di-
vergent	 business	 objectives	 and	 risk	 preferences.	













(9)	 Non-discriminatory	 entry	 to	 the	 demand	 re-
sponse	market	and	freedom	to	offer	services	to	
consumers	for	intermediaries.
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Is the current retail market design suitable to 






tariff;	 second,	balancing	costs	 are	 socialised,	partly	
by	the	supplier	among	his	customers,	and	partly	by	
the	 TSO	 among	 all	 network	 users.	 Such	 arrange-
ments	 severely	 reduce	 the	 incentives	 for	 consum-
ers	to	become	active.	Therefore,	in	the	long	term,	it	
is	necessary	 to	 rethink	 the	market	design	with	 the	







make	deliberate	 choices	 about	 their	 electricity	
supply,	and	to	incorporate	their	flexibility	into	
such	 choices.	 As	 a	 result,	 balancing	 costs	 are	




ment	 is	 fallacious,	as	we	have	demonstrated	 in	our	
original	 approach	 focusing	 on	 contracts,	 that	 con-
sumers can be engaged	if	they	have	options	that	re-
flect	 their	diversity	 and	are	 adequately	 empowered	
to	make	 choices.	The	THINK	 report	 also	provides	
recommendations	on	how to get there,	including	a	
toolkit	of	consumer	empowerment	and	protection,	
necessary	 adaptation	 of	 market	 rules	 and	 regula-
tion,	as	well	as	a	new	retail	market	design.	Therefore,	
the	 shift	 towards	 active	demand	 response	 requires	
substantial	 efforts,	 but	 it	 is feasible	 and	 necessary.	
Indeed,	 a	 functioning	 retail	market	 could	not	ma-
terialise	without	the	active	participation	of	consum-
ers,	 and	 the	 decarbonisation	 targets	 can	 hardly	 be	
achieved	without	flexibility	provided	by	the	demand	
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